Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-body Dualism by Kirk Ludwig







In “The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal 
Identity Defended” (2013), Martine Nida-Rümelin (NR) responded 
to my (Ludwig 2013) criticism of her (2010) argument for subject-
body dualism. The crucial premise of her (2010) argument was that 
there is a factual difference between the claims that in a fission 
case the original person is identical with one of the successors. I 
argued that, on the three most plausible interpretations of ‘factual 
difference’, the argument fails. NR responds that I missed the 
intended, fourth interpretation, and that the argument on the third 
interpretation goes through with an additional assumption. I argue 
that the fourth interpretation, while insufficient as stated, reveals 
an assumption that provides an argument independently of 
considerations involving fission cases: in first person thought 
about future properties we have a positive conception of the self 
that rules out having empirical criteria of transtemporal identity. 
However, I argue that the considerations offered for this thesis fail 
to establish it, and that we do not, in fact, bring ourselves under 
any positive conception in first person thought, but rather think 
about ourselves directly and without conceptual mediation. This 
explains why it appears open in fission cases that the original 
person is identical with one of the successors, while what is 
possible is constrained by the actual nature of the self as referred 
to in first person thought. I argue also, incidentally, that on the 
third interpretation, the first premise of the argument is 
inconsistent with the necessity of identity. !
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Imagine perfect fissioning of a person A into two successors who are 
equally good candidates for being the person who underwent the 
fissioning, LA (on the left) and RA (on the right), on the basis of all the 
material and psychological relations (empirical relations for short) that 
each bears to A. Imagine that if LA had been produced by the process 
without RA, we would judge that A = LA, and vice versa. We seem, 
prima facie, to understand what it would be for A to survive as (be 
identical with) LA (and not RA), and what it would be for A to survive as 
(be identical with) RA (and not LA). Does this show that 
[SBD]  A is not identical with, or constituted by, or composed 
(even in part) by a body, or any material stuff, or even 
any immaterial stuff. 
Call [SBD] the thesis of subject-body dualism. 
In (Nida-Rümelin 2006) and (Nida-Rümelin 2010), Martine Nida-
Rümelin (NR) argued that these considerations do establish [SBD]. The 
master argument has three premises:  
1. There is a factual difference between the claim that someone is one or 
the other of the two continuers in fission cases or we are subject to a 
pervasive illusion in our thoughts about personal identity over time 
(call this the illusion theory). 
2. There could be a factual difference between the claims that someone 
is one or the other of the two continuers in fission cases only if 
subject-body dualism were true.  
3. The illusion theory is untenable (false).  
4. Subject-body dualism is true [1-3].  
Granting premise 3 for the sake of argument, we get the streamlined 
argument (when I refer to premises, I will have the streamlined argument 
in mind):  
1. There is a factual difference between the claim that someone is one or 
the other of the two continuers in fission cases. 
2. There could be a factual difference between the claims that someone 
is one or the other of the two continuers in fission cases only if 
subject-body dualism were true.  
3. Subject-body dualism is true [1-2]. 
The basic idea of the argument is that the materialist can’t make sense of 
there being a factual difference between the claim that someone is one or 
the other of two continuers in fission cases. The reason is that the 
materialist has to appeal to bodily or psychological continuity or some 
combination of these to ground claims about transtemporal identity (call  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these empirical criteria of transtemporal identity), but in the fission case 
there is complete symmetry with respect to all the empirical criteria 
between A and RA, on the one hand, and A and LA, on the other. 
Whatever you can say about either case you can say equally about the 
other. How then can there be a factual difference between the two claims? 
In (Ludwig 2013), I argued that on the three most plausible 
interpretations of ‘factual difference’ in premise 2, the argument failed. 
Consider our initial case, and let ‘D’ describe the relevant facts 
completely except for the facts about identity between A, LA, and RA. 
Then consider the claims P1-P3. 
P1: D and A = LA. 
P2: D and A = RA. 
P3: D and A ≠ LA and A ≠ RA. 
We assume that LA ≠ RA. In terms of this case, the three interpretations 
of ‘there is a factual difference between P1 and P2’ are these: 
(1) P1 is true and P2 false or P1 is false and P2 is true. 
(2) P1 and P2 differ in content (express different propositions). 
(3) P1 and P2 both express genuine possibilities. 
(1) says that there being a factual difference is there being a fact of the 
matter which is true and which false. (2) says that the factual difference is 
a matter of P1 and P2 expressing different propositions. (3) says that it is 
a matter of their expressing genuine possibilities (they might express 
different propositions but neither express something that is possible). 
Briefly, I argued in (Ludwig 2013) that (1) cannot be the right 
interpretation because NR allows that P3 is a genuine possibility and she 
doesn’t argue it is not actual. I argued that (2) isn’t sufficient for the 
argument because the materialist can make sense of there being a 
difference in content between P1 and P2 by saying that that ‘A = LA/RA’ 
means ‘LA/RA’s body is A’s body’. Finally, I argued (in part—I return to 
this below) that (3) isn’t sufficient because, even granting that, in a world 
in which P1 or P2, A would not have empirical criteria of transtemporal 
identity, it would be a modal fallacy to infer we don’t actually have 
empirical criteria of transtemporal identity. 
NR responded in (Nida-Rümelin 2013) that (i) the criticism fails because 
it overlooks the intended interpretation of factual difference (let’s call this 
the fourth interpretation, which I will explain below), and that (ii), in any 
case, the third interpretation is sufficient for the argument to go through, 
when supplemented with the assumption that objects have their 
transtemporal identity conditions essentially. I respond in this paper.  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In section 2, I take up the fourth interpretation, identify the underlying 
assumption that motivates it (that in first person thought we have a 
positive conception of the self that excludes empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity), and formulate an argument for subject-body 
dualism that rests directly on that assumption. In section 3, I argue that 
we do not have good reason to accept the assumption because relevant 
features of first person thought are accommodated by our referring to 
ourselves directly and not under any mode of presentation (or by 
description). In section 4, I respond to the claim that the argument on the 
third interpretation is successful when combined with the assumption that 
we have our criteria for transtemporal identity essentially. I argue that the 
third interpretation requires a contradiction be true because it is 
inconsistent with the necessity of identity, so that the only possibilities we 
could be thinking of are epistemic possibilities. I explain this in terms of 
the account of first person thought developed in section 3. Section 5 is a 
short conclusion. 
2. The Fourth Interpretation and the Reformulated Argument !
The fourth interpretation is expressed in the following passage:  
[4I] … the fourth (and originally intended) interpretation of the 
claim that there is a factual difference [between] P1 and P2 … 
can be made explicit in the following way: there is an objective 
feature which would have to be realized in addition to what 
description D states for P1 to be realized, and there is (a 
different) objective feature which would have to be realized in 
addition to what description D states for P2 to be realized. 
(Nida-Rümelin 2013, 705)  
NR says that (i) “that there is a factual difference between P1 and P2 is 
compatible with the metaphysical impossibility of both P1 and P2,” for 
(ii) it “does not imply that the fulfillment of description D is 
metaphysically compatible with the relevant feature which would render 
P1 actual” and likewise for P2, and “so it does not imply the 
metaphysical possibility of P1 or the metaphysical possibility of P2” (loc. 
cit.).  As the last clause indicates, (ii) is the ground for (i).  1
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 In her (Nida-Rümelin 2010), NR wrote: “This difference appears to be factual in this 1
sense: ‘D and Andrea is L-Andrea’ and ‘D and Andrea is R-Andrea’ are not just two 
legitimate description[s] of one and the same course of events. Rather there is—according 
to the way we conceive of the situation—an objective possible feature of the world that 
makes one of the two descriptions true and the other wrong. The factual difference may 
be described [by] pointing out that Andrea will have a different future depending on 
which of the two possible identity facts will obtain” (2010, 196). One might be forgiven 
for thinking NR was assuming that P1 and P2 were possible, and that the relevant possible 
feature of the world, as it would make true one of the two descriptions (which here are 
explicitly P1 and P2), was compatible with D.
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Would a factual difference in this sense help us to understand why 
premise 2 of the (streamlined) argument should be accepted?  
I do not think that [4I] is sufficient, but I also think that there is more in 
the background than is expressed here, and we will come to this in a 
moment. The reason that [4I] is not sufficient is that a proponent of 
empirical criteria of personal identity over time could accept it as it 
stands. If one thinks that our criteria for personal identity over time 
involve bodily or psychological continuity (or both), then in fission cases, 
given that LA ≠ RA, that A is not identical with the pair of LA and RA, 
and that the symmetry of the case precludes choosing one over the other, 
the only option is to say that A does not survive. A does not survive 
because survival requires there be a unique closest continuer of A (which 
is close enough—let this be understood). Where there is no unique closest 
continuer, A does not survive. (This is what we say about cell fission.) 
How can the proponent of an empirical criterion of personal identity 
accept that there is an objective feature which has to be realized in 
addition to what D states for P1 to be realized? Given that it does not 
have to be a feature which is compatible with D, she can say that the 
proposition that LA is the best continuer of A expresses the relevant 
objective fact that you would have to add—though it turns out to be 
incompatible with D, which entails that there is no best continuer of A. 
Since it is incompatible with D, it is clearly something in addition to what 
D expresses that would have to obtain. If we were to add that the 
additional objective features were compatible with D, that is P1 and P2 
were each possible, then this response would be closed off. But then this 
would be equivalent to the third proposal after all. As we will see in 
section 4, however, the third proposal is incoherent.  2!
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 A referee for this journal suggested that one might say that the additional objective 2
features (call them F1 and F2 respectively) were each compatible with D and that this was 
still compatible with P1 and P2 being metaphysically impossible. So the idea is this: that 
F1 obtains and D is possible, and P1 entails that F1 obtains but not vice versa, and that F2 
obtains and D is possible and P2 entails that F2 obtains, but not vice versa, and that is 
what the factual difference comes to. But it is not required that P1 or P2 be possible. 
However, this divides into two cases. Either P1 or P2 is possible or neither P1 nor P2 is 
possible. The first case collapses into proposal three (see note 11). So we may restrict 
attention to the viability of the claim that F1 and F2 are both compatible with D but P1 
and P2 are impossible. 
This is not NR’s intended interpretation. On the intended interpretation, the factual 
difference “does not imply that the fulfillment of description D is metaphysically 
compatible with the relevant feature which would render P1 actual” and likewise for P2. 
Therefore, as noted, on NR’s interpretation of the factual difference, it could involve 
empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, such as being the closest (close enough) 
bodily continuer, since the features don’t have to be compatible with D. 
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However, [4I] does not fully express the underlying thought. We need to 
look at the ground for the claim that there is an additional objective 
feature that would have to be added. NR says that we‑  3
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Still, could NR appeal to this new suggestion instead? Not without rejecting the reasoning 
she actually engages in. I noted that (ii) is supposed to be the reason for (i). 
(i) the factual difference is compatible with the impossibility of P1 and 
P2, 
(ii) the factual difference “does not imply that the fulfillment of 
description D is metaphysically compatible with the relevant feature 
which would render P1 actual” and likewise for P2. 
NR states (ii) and then immediately writes: “so it [the factual difference] does not imply 
the metaphysical possibility of P1 or the metaphysical possibility of P2.” This is why she 
says that the factual difference is compatible with the impossibility of P1 and P2, that is, 
(i). More specifically, (ii) is the ground for (i) because the idea is that if only F1 could be 
compatibly added to D that would suffice for A = LA, and similarly for F2 and A = RA. 
That is why we get to say that F1/F2 are objective features that would be just what has to 
be added to D for P1/P2 to be realized. But if it is left open that they are not compatible 
with D, it is left open that P1 and P2 are not possible. If we said instead that D was 
compatible with F1, then, by hypothesis, the relation required for A = LA would be 
realized in some possible world, and so A = LA is possible. And if we said that D was 
compatible with F2, then the relation required for A = RA would be realized in some 
possible world and A = RA is possible. But if either is, surely the other is, given the 
symmetry of the situation, and so we would be back with interpretation 3. 
Why not reject the reasoning? Couldn’t one just insist that F1 is compatible with D 
(mutatis mutandis for F2) and that P1 and P2 are impossible? But now why are P1 and P2 
impossible? It is not because of the symmetry involving empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity, because we are rejecting empirical criteria of transtemporal 
identity. So if the objective non-empirical feature F1 that would be just what has to be 
added to D to realize P1 is compatible with D, there is a possible world in which D and 
the objective feature F1 which we need to add to D to realize P1 are co-realized. That is 
all then that is needed, given what we have said, to realize P1. So P1 is possible. 
Otherwise there is no content to the idea that the feature F1 is an objective feature that is 
what is to be added to D to realize P1. Similarly for F2 and P2.  
What if one said: but why do F1 and F2 have to be sufficient for P1 and P2 (given D)? 
Why can’t they just be necessary? NR aims to show that transtemporal identity of 
subjects of experience is not grounded by empirical criteria. Thus, in a case like the 
fission case except that LA/RA was the only survivor, there would be an objective feature, 
F1+/F2+, that was non-empirical which in the circumstances sufficed for A=LA/A=RA. 
Thus, F1+/F2+ is the feature that would have to be realized in addition to D for P1/P2 to 
be realized, where it is not merely a necessary condition but sufficient, given that D 
duplicates whatever empirical relations there are between A and LA/RA, in the 
circumstances in which F1+/F2+ are sufficient for A=LA/A=RA. And now we are back to 
where we started. So the trouble is this: if we want to acknowledge that P1 and P2 are 
both impossible, but we want to reject empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, we 
can’t say the non-empirical condition that is all that needs to be added to underwrite P1 
(mutatis mutandis for P2) is compatible with D.
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[a] … have a clear positive understanding of an objective feature 
of the world that would make it the case that one of the two 
successors (and not the other) is the original person. [i] If, for 
instance, P1 is realized, then the original person Andrea [my A] is 
living L-Andrea’s life after the operation. [ii] Andrea has a 
completely different life after the operation (she has a 
fundamentally different future when considered from her 
perspective at the earlier moment) if P2 is realized. We have the 
conceptual capacity to positively conceive this difference … . [b] 
The basic idea can be put quite simply: we understand the 
difference between P1 and P2 by considering it from Andrea’s 
perspective. Thinking about Andrea in the first person mode we are 
able to grasp the difference between a world in which she (rigid 
designation of Andrea) will undergo experiences related to the 
body with the left brain hemisphere, and a world in which she will 
undergo the experiences related to the body with the right brain 
hemisphere. (703-4; labeling in square brackets added)  
[b] is more fundamental here than [a]. The conditionals [i] and [ii] would 
usually be treated as presupposing that the antecedents are possible (so 
that they are not just trivially true because of a necessarily false 
antecedent). But we are not supposed to assume that P1 and P2 are 
possible because D and the objective feature that would make it the case 
that, e.g., in the case of P1, A = LA was true may not be compatible. But 
given this, so far the proponent of the empirical criterion of identity can 
accept [i] and [ii].  
Turn to [b] then. What is it to think about Andrea in the first person 
mode? To elucidate this, we should return to the original article (Nida-
Rümelin 2010, sec. 4-6). This will reveal that what is crucial is the 
content of the positive conception of the difference between P1 and P2 (at 
least so far as what it excludes), and we will here identify, I believe, the 
fulcrum of the argument. 
The key idea is brought out by first imagining oneself in A’s position. You 
may wonder whether you will survive fissioning and whether, if you do, 
you will be PL (the person associated with the left hand body) or PR (the 
person associated with the right hand body). You wonder whether in the 
morning, if you wake up, you will see PL’s face in the mirror or PR’s face 
in the mirror, whether you will feel pain if PL’s body is pricked, or if 
PR’s body is pricked, and so on. You have a clear grasp, it seems, of what 
it would be to be one or the other of PL or PR from the first person point 
of view, that is, of what facts would be appropriate for the one hypothesis 
or the other from that point of view, where these facts can be stated in the 
form “I will have property P at moment m’. From this, NR concludes that 
Claim: 1: Transtemporal self-attributions are conceptually prior to 
self-identifications. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 203)  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The argument is given in the following passage:  
You understand the assumption ‘I will be the L-person’ on the basis 
of understanding thoughts like ‘I will have property P.’ In other 
words and more precisely: you understand what has to be the case 
for your utterance of ‘I will be the L-person’ to be true on the basis 
of your understanding of what would render your self-attribution ‘I 
will have property P in the future moment m’ true. We can 
formulate this claim in a more abstract way: transtemporal self-
attributions (thoughts that can be expressed by sentences like ‘I 
will have property P’ or ‘I had property P’) are conceptually prior 
to self-identifications (thoughts that can be expressed by sentences 
of the form ‘I will be P at moment m’ or ‘I was P at moment m’). 
(Nida-Rümelin 2010, 198)  
It is important here also that this be a “clear positive understanding of 
what would have to be the case for [one’s] thought ‘I will be the L-
person’ to be true … due to [one’s] clear positive understanding of what 
has to be the case for certain I-thoughts of the form ‘I will have property 
P’ to be true” (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 201, emphasis added).  
NR adds to this a second, important claim, namely, that your 
“understanding of what has to be the case for your I-thought ‘I will have 
property P’ to be true in no way depends on the empirical criteria of 
transtemporal identity of subjects of experience that you implicitly 
accept” (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 199). NR argues for this by asking us to 
consider whether one’s understanding of what it would be for one to be in 
pain in the future, for example, would change when one’s explicit 
conception of the requirements for personal identity change. For 
example, suppose one confidently expects that one will survive when 
one’s body and brain are destroyed provided that a new brain is created 
from a scan of the old with the same brain states, preserving 
psychological continuity. One thinks, of a moment m after the expected 
destruction of one’s body, ‘I will be in pain at m’. Then suppose one 
comes to reject the psychological continuity account of person identity. 
One comes to think now ‘It is false that I will be in pain at m’. You 
change your mind about the truth of the thought ‘I will be in pain at m’ 
but “you have not thereby changed your understanding of the content of 
your own I-thought. Your conceptual grasp of what has to be the case for 
your I-thought to be true has not changed at all” (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 
199). Only your view of what empirical criteria are necessary and 
sufficient for your I-thought to be true has changed. NR concludes that 
our conceptual grasp of what it is for one have a certain property at a 
future time is independent of any empirical criteria for transtemporal 
identity you accept.  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Claim 2: Transtemporal self-attribution is conceptually invariant 
with respect to changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria 
of identity of people across time. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 
203)  
This contrasts with individuals who are not conscious. Claims 1 and 2 
(NR argues) entail claim 3:  
Claim 3: Transtemporal self-identification is conceptually invariant 
with respect to changes in a thinker’s accepted criteria of 
identity of people across time. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 203)  
NR argues that given claims 1-3, it follows that the claims apply also for 
other-directed thought. If we think another is capable of first person 
thought, we will think that she will conceive of herself as a subject of 
properties in the future in a way that is conceptually fundamental relative 
to self-identification, and conceptually invariant with respect to views 
about empirical criteria for personal identity. In thinking about what it 
would be for another person to be one or the other of two people who 
result from a fission event involving her, we will think of it as a matter of 
what has to be so for her first person thought about her having future 
properties to be true. NR argues further that this extends to subjects of 
experience who are not capable of first person thoughts, such as infants 
and non-linguistic animals: we ask whether if such a subject could think 
first person thoughts, its first person thought about its future properties 
would be true, in asking about what individual it will be in the future. 
This then generates claims 4-6: 
Claim 4: Transtemporal attribution of properties to other 
experiencing subjects is conceptually invariant with 
respect to changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria of 
subject identity across time.  
Claim 5: Transtemporal attribution of properties to others is 
conceptually prior to transtemporal identification with 
respect to others.  
Claim 6:  The conceptual content of other-directed transtemporal 
identification is invariant with respect to possible 
changes of the accepted criteria of subject identity 
across time. Transtemporal criteria of subject identity 
do not enter the conceptual content of other-directed 
transtemporal identification. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 
204-205) 
The two most important claims here are that in thinking in the first person 
mode about what our future properties are (a) we have a positive 
understanding of what is involved (b) is independent of our views with 
respect to change in the thinker’s accepted criteria of subject identity 
across time. If this is true, then we cannot make use of the rejoinder to the  
13
Kirk Ludwig
fourth proposal considered above, because while it would capture an 
objective fact that would be something in addition to what is expressed 
by D, it would not be independent of empirical criteria for transtemporal 
identification.  
The emphasis on a positive understanding in (a) is important. It is this I 
wish to examine. I grant in thinking of ourselves as having properties in 
the future in the “first person mode” we do not think of ourselves under a 
conception that presupposes empirical criteria of transtemporal identity. 
But the idea that we have a positive understanding of what is involved 
goes beyond this, and this, as we will see, is required if the argument is to 
go through.  
What does the emphasis on positive understanding in (a) come to and 
why is it important? P1 and P2 differ only in that in P1 where the 
predicate ‘= LA’ appears in P2 the predicate ‘=RA’ appears. We might say 
that the positive understanding of the difference involved attaches to 
these, but (i) this would not give any special weight to the first person 
mode of thought and (ii) if this is all the positive difference comes to the 
proponent of empirical criteria of transtemporal identity could appeal to it 
as well. The positive understanding that carries the weight must then, I 
think, attach to the mode of presentation of the self. Thus, the weight 
rests on the idea that we think in the first person mode of ourselves in a 
way that positively characterizes the self so as to exclude that the self has 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. It has to exclude that the self 
has empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, because if it leaves it open 
(if it were “topic neutral,” for example), the argument for subject-body 
dualism collapses.  4
If we add to this that 
[MT] if we are identical with, composed in part, or constituted by any 
material object or stuff (or even immaterial stuff), then we have 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity,  
we can infer that we are not identical with, etc., any material object (or 
immaterial stuff). This would secure subject-body dualism. If we assume 
that necessarily subjects of experience are capable of the relevant sort of 
non-illusory first person thought, then we can conclude that subject-body 
dualism is necessarily true.  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empirical criteria of transtemporal identity. Suppose it doesn’t. Then whatever factual 
difference there is between P1 and P2 that rests on this positive understanding is 
compatible with empirical criteria of transtemporal identity, and therefore compatible with 
a materialist view, and therefore compatible with the rejection of subject-body dualism. 
So the argument for subject-body dualism won’t go through if we leave it open that we 
have empirical criteria for transtemporal identity.
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In light of this, we can see that the appeal to a factual difference between 
P1 and P2 is not essential for the argument. It rests on an assumption that 
will drive the argument independently. We can state the argument as 
follows: 
1. We think (correctly) in the first person mode of ourselves in a way 
that positively characterizes the self so as to exclude that the self has 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. 
2. If we are identical with, composed in part, or constituted by any 
material object or stuff (or even immaterial stuff), then we have 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. [MT] 
3. We are not identical with any material object [1-2].  
Call this the fundamental argument. !
3. First person thought !
I agree that the fundamental argument is valid, but reject the first 
premise. The first premise rests on claim 2. I reject claim 2, repeated 
here, on the reading that supports the first premise. 
Claim 2. Transtemporal self-attribution is conceptually invariant 
with respect to changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria 
of identity of people across time. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 
203) 
I accept a weaker claim, however. The weaker claim is 2*.  
Claim 2* The content of transtemporal self-attributions is invariant 
with respect to changes in the thinker’s accepted criteria 
of identity of people across time. 
This is distinct from Claim 2, which I take to entail, via the modifier 
‘conceptually’, that there is a positive way in which we present the self 
that excludes criteria of identity of people over time. (If we say that claim 
2 and 2* are the same, then the objection is that premise 1 doesn’t 
follow.)  
How can claim 2* be true though claim 2 is not? (Alternatively, how can 
claim 2* be true yet premise 1 not follow?) The answer is that we could 
think of ourselves directly, without bringing ourselves under any concept, 
or conception, at all, other than, perhaps, that of a thing, and think of 
ourselves directly as being related to a time in the future of the present by 
having a certain property then. This would explain why what we are 
thinking is invariant with respect to our criteria for transtemporal identity 
over time. To put it in other words, we do not pick out the future self as 




and attribute a property to whatever is denoted by that, but we think:  
at some time t in the future of the present, I [thought of directly at 
the present time] have such and such a property at t.  5
To take an example, think about the proposition expressed by the English 
sentence ‘I will have a headache tomorrow morning’, as asserted by me 
now, taking ‘I’ to introduce into the proposition expressed just its 
referent, i.e., the speaker. The proposition is a singular proposition. The 
rule for the use of the pronoun involves a description:  
(R) For any x, any time t, any subject u, ‘I’ refers to x at t as 
uttered by u iff x = u.  
But the rule doesn’t enter into the content of the proposition, only what 
object it assigns as the referent of ‘I’. Take ‘@’ to be a directly referring 
term that picks out me.  Then, where ‘N’ directly refers to the time of 6
utterance (and ‘>’ means ‘is later than’), the proposition is:  
[FH] [∃t: t > N](@ has a headache at t and t lies within the 
morning of the tomorrow of N) 
That is clearly invariant with respect to @’s views about transtemporal 
criteria for personal identity. If the content of the thought I have when I 
express myself using the sentence ‘I will have a headache tomorrow 
morning’ is given by the proposition that this sentence expresses, then 
while claim 2* is true, claim 2 (interpreted as sketched above) is not 
(because as interpreted above, claim 2 says we present ourselves in first 
person thought in some positive manner, as having some features, 
whereas if the thought about the self is direct, the self is not presented as 
having any features). Likewise then premise 1, repeated here, of the 
fundamental argument is false. What is true is premise 1′. 
1. We think (correctly) in the first person mode of ourselves in a 
way that positively characterizes the self so as to exclude that 
the self has empirical criteria for transtemporal identity.  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 I made this claim in note 3 of the 2013 paper, and related it to the final point I made in 5
that paper. NR’s reply has helped me to see that this is where the most fundamental 
disagreement between us lies. 
 The reader will notice that I am not distinguishing de re and de se thoughts. I give an 6
explanation for the substitution puzzles that motivate drawing the distinction in (Ludwig 
1996). My view is that when one uses the first person pronoun, given knowledge of the 
rule, one uses it on the basis of thoughts that are indeed directly about the self, but when 
we use a proper name, even if it has the same referent, there is no guarantee that one 
locates the referent directly in thought. This is what gives rise to the substitution puzzles. 
The crucial point for the argument in the text is just that we do think of ourselves directly 
(in thought) when we express a thought using the first person pronoun, this is an attitude 
toward a singular proposition, and this expresses what we have in mind by the first person 
mode of thought.
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1’.We think (correctly) in the first person mode of ourselves in a 
way that does not include that the self has empirical criteria for 
transtemporal identity.  
1′ is compatible with our having empirical criteria for transtemporal 
identity. What are the implications for claims 1 and 3, repeated here? 
Claim: 1: Transtemporal self-attributions are conceptually prior to 
self-identifications. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 203)  
Claim 3: Transtemporal self-identification is conceptually invariant 
with respect to changes in a thinker’s accepted criteria of 
identify of people across time. (Nida-Rümelin 2010, 203)  
In thinking about oneself as having a property in the future, as in [FH], 
one thinks of oneself directly at the present time, and of oneself so 
thought of as related by having a headache then to a time located in the 
future of the present time. This guarantees that the person one is thinking 
of as having a headache at a time subsequent to the present is oneself. But 
does this show that self-attributions are conceptually prior to self-
identifications?  
What does this mean? The natural reading is that one can self-attribute 
future properties without first identifying some future self as oneself. If 
this is what it means, then we can accept it, but it does not get us very far, 
if the present picture is correct. For on that picture, while it is true that 
when one thinks of oneself as having a property in the future, there is no 
question that arises about identifying oneself as the one that one is 
thinking about, this is just because one is thinking about oneself directly 
in the present as being related to a future time which one picks out by a 
restricted quantifier anchored by a direct reference to the time of the 
thought. One has not identified oneself as some future individual. One 
has only picked oneself out in the way one does when thinking a thought 
about a property one has at the present moment. One is not called on to 
think in any substantive way about what it would be for one to survive to 
have a property in the future. And self-attributions of future properties in 
this way leaves it open what would have to be true for anything at any 
future time to be oneself. 
What about claim 3, though? This has to be given up if claim 2 is given 
up because it would, like claim 2, presuppose that in thinking about our 
future selves in the first person way we have a positive conception of the 
self which rules out our having empirical criteria of transtemporal 
identity. 
These remarks carry over to claims 4-6. 
So far, I have only said what follows if we accept this sketch of the 
content of first person thoughts about future properties of the self. One 
might object at this point to the account of the content of the proposition 
expressed by ‘I will have a headache tomorrow’ or to the claim that the  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thought I have about properties of my future self expressed with the first 
person pronoun in subject position is properly specified by the 
proposition expressed by the sentence that I use. I respond to this in two 
stages. First, I give an argument to show that we do not pick ourselves 
out via any purely qualitative mode of presentation, so that there must be 
some element of direct reference in thought to the self. Second, I argue 
that, given this, we have no reason to think we subsume the self under 
any positive conception or concept in referring to ourselves in the “first 
person mode.”  
The argument for the claim that we do not pick ourselves out via any 
purely qualitative mode of presentation, goes as follows (Ludwig 1996).  
1. We know that we are able to think about ourselves and attribute 
properties to ourselves.  
2. If we were able to think of ourselves only by way of a purely 
qualitative mode of presentation (or description), then we would not 
know that we are able to think about ourselves and attribute 
properties to ourselves.  
3. Therefore, we do not pick ourselves out only by way of a purely 
qualitative mode of presentation (or description).  
The subargument for premise 2 goes as follows.  
1. We do not know that the universe does not contain (timelessly 
speaking) qualitative duplicates of everything that exists (or at least 
of ourselves up to the extent of our knowledge).  
2. If the universe contains qualitative duplicates of everything that 
exists (or at least ourselves up to the extent of our knowledge), then 
no purely qualitative mode of presentation (or description) uniquely 
denotes any individual (or ourselves to the extent of our knowledge). 
3. Therefore, if we were able to think of ourselves only by way of a 
purely qualitative mode of presentation (or description), we would 
not know that we are able to think about ourselves and attribute 
properties to ourselves 
The argument for premise 1 of the subargument is that we do not know 
that, for example, Nietzsche’s hypothesis of eternal recurrence is not true, 
that is, we do not know that the universe does not repeat each temporal 
segment of it qualitatively identically an infinite number of times.  7
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 I say ‘for example’, because this is not the only hypothesis we could appeal to here. Do 7
we know that there are not an infinite number of spatio-temporally isolated universes (like 
David Lewis “possible worlds” but without the commitment to explaining modal claims 
in terms of them) among which there are qualitative duplicates of ours? We could not rule 
these out by any empirical means, and since it is possible that a universe contain an 
infinite number of spatio-temporally isolated universes one of which is just like ours, 
there is no a priori argument to show that this hypothesis is false. 
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It might be said in response that physics tells us that Nietzsche’s 
hypothesis is in fact false.  The second law of thermodynamics ensures 8
that the universe will die a heat death in a state of maximum entropy. 
However, this overstates what we know. The matter is not entirely settled 
in physics whether the universe iterates through infinite cycles (a Big 
Bang followed by a Big Crunch, followed by a Big Bang and so on).  But 9
even granting that it is settled that cycles were not physically possible—
that the universe is open and will die a heat death—this doesn’t matter. 
The fact is that we do not need to know what physicists know (if they 
know that) in order to know that we are able to refer to ourselves (see 
note 7 also). For most people, it is epistemically open that there are 
qualitative duplicates of them, but this is not a threat to their knowledge 
that they can refer to themselves. So the real force of the argument is that 
our knowledge that we think about ourselves is not hostage to whether 
there are qualitative duplicates of us, but this could be so only if we could 
think about ourselves directly and not only as the unique possessors of 
some set of (purely qualitative) properties. 
This leaves it open that we think of ourselves by a mode of presentation 
that functions like a complex demonstrative. Let ‘subject’ express the 
special conception of the type of being that represents a positive 
conception of the self that excludes empirical criteria of transtemporal 
identity. Then it is open still that we think about ourselves in a thought of 
the form ‘that subject is in pain’. We can think of ‘that subject’ as a 
restricted quantifier of the form ‘the x: x is that and x is a subject’ as 
suggested in (Lepore 2000), or as we could think of the function of 
‘subject’ as a filter on how the demonstrative element refers, as Kaplan 
suggested (Kaplan 1989, 515). In either case, we refer directly to the self, 
but at the same time in doing so bring the self under the concept of a 
subject. The second of these components, though, does not play a crucial 
role in the mechanism of reference itself. 
My argument against first person thought involving this extra component 
has three parts. First, (a) it is gratuitous and (b) we should not adopt 
views that are gratuitous. It is gratuitous because the main diagnostic for 
there being a positive conception of the self is that in self-attributing 
future thoughts we think of the self in a way that is invariant with respect 
to changes in our conception of empirical criteria for transtemporal  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 Eternal recurrence does not follow form the hypothesis of infinite time. Consider two 8
cylinders with marks that line up at time zero, one of which begins rotating once per 
second and the other √2 times per second. They will never line up again in the original 
configuration, since that would require √2 to be equal to the ratio of two integers. This is a 
variant of a counterexample provided by Georg Simmel in 1907 and reported in 
(Kaufmann 1974, 327). What is at issue is not the necessity but the epistemic possibility 
of eternal recurrence.
 See (Penrose 2010).9
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identity. But once we see that we refer to the self directly, we have an 
explanation for this that does not require that we bring the self under any 
positive conception. Second, we could respond to the charge that it is 
gratuitous if there were present in reflection on self-attributions of 
properties some positive conception of the self that did exclude empirical 
criteria of transtemporal identity. But we do not, in fact, bring ourselves 
under such a positive conception of the self in self-attributing properties. 
Or, to speak more cautiously, I do not find, that when I rap my knuckles 
on my desk, and have the thought that I am in pain, I am in thinking I qua 
subject am in pain, where the concept of a subject is a positive 
conception of what I am thinking about. It is implied by my thinking 
about myself at all that I am a thinking thing, but this does not enter into 
the content of the thought itself, apart from its “predicate”. Even if it did, 
it would not be the right sort of conception to support the exclusion of 
empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. Third, if we did bring the self 
under a positive concept that excluded empirical criteria of transtemporal 
identity, then we should be able to articulate what about it precludes our 
having them. What is it though? Is it that we are composed of immaterial 
stuff rather than material stuff? This won’t work because the same 
argument applies here, as NR notes. If we were some immaterial stuff, 
there would be criteria for transtemporal identity appropriate for it, but it 
is clear that the content of self-attributions of future properties would be 
invariant with respect to our conceptions of what that involved. Only 
thinking of the self as a thing that is utterly simple, and whose persistence 
through time is not governed by informative criteria at all, would seem to 
have the right character. This would not rule out (a priori) its being a 
material thing that was simple, however. And it is hardly clear that when 
we think about ourselves we are thinking about something that is utterly 
simple.  This seems to be an open question relative to our thinking of 10
ourselves in the first person mode, in the way we express when we use 
the first person pronoun. 
Finally, even if we did invariably bring the self under such a concept, 
given that it is not required for us to refer to ourselves in thought in the 
first person mode, it would remain an open question whether we were 
correct to bring ourselves under such a concept, and this would not 
require that we think in general that we mistakenly attribute thoughts to 
ourselves, for the illusion would extend only to what is from the point of 
view of our ordinary attributions an extraneous and unnecessary 
addendum to first person thoughts.  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 This point is connected with the remark in note 10 in (Ludwig 2013) that the original 10
argument applies only to material objects that are subject to fissioning. Absolutely simple 
objects are not capable of fissioning. 
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To summarize: in first person thought we think about ourselves directly at 
the present time. This is true also when we attribute to ourselves 
properties in the future, because we are thinking of ourselves as picked 
out now directly as being related to times in the future (of the time of the 
thought) by way of having various properties then. Thus, the content of 
those thoughts are invariant with respect to variations in our conceptions 
of criteria for transtemporal identity of people. This does not require that 
we have a positive concept of the self that excludes empirical criteria for 
transtemporal identity. The suggestion that we do bring the self under 
such a concept is not supported by reflection on first person thought, and 
in the absence of that it is gratuitous to suggest that we bring the self 
under such a concept. Finally, even if we did, it would not show that we 
did not have empirical criteria for transtemporal identity and whatever 
illusion this involved would be localized and not undermine the vast 
majority of what we think about ourselves. The fundamental argument 
fails.  !
4. Possibilities and the Third Interpretation !
I turn now to the question whether the third interpretation of the factual 
difference between P1 and P2 supports subject-body dualism. For 
convenience, I repeat P1-P3 here. 
P1: D and A = LA.  
P2: D and A = RA.  
P3: D and A ≠ LA and A ≠ RA.  
The third interpretation was that P1 and P2 are both genuine possibilities. 
On this interpretation, the second premise of the streamlined master 
argument can be reformulated as in 2′. 
2′. P1 and P2 could be genuine possibilities only if subject-body 
dualism were true.  
In (Ludwig 2013), I argued (in part) that: for the possibility that P1 or the 
possibility that P2 to show that as a matter of fact A did not have 
empirical transtemporal identity conditions, it would have to be necessary 
that in every possible world either A = LA or A = RA; but this is 
incompatible with the assumption that it is possible that A ≠ RA and A ≠ 
LA, and if that last were true at the actual world, it would be compatible 
with our having empirical criteria of transtemporal identity in the actual 
world. 
NR responds by introducing the assumption that we have our 
transtemporal criteria for identity essentially. If there is a possible world 
in which A = LA (when RA is also produced from A by a fission event), 
in that world A does not have empirical transtemporal identity conditions.  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If persons have their transtemporal identity conditions essentially, it 
follows that in the actual world A does not have empirical transtemporal 
identity conditions.  
Even granting the assumption, there is a problem with the third 
interpretation. I introduced this problem in the (2013) paper as a response 
to the first objection. That relied on the charge that P3 was supposed to be 
possible. But if it is, then, given the necessity of identity, P3 rules out P1 
and P2. I replied that the rejoinder was too powerful, because it also 
means that P1 and P2 cannot both be possibilities. It would have been 
more straightforward, perhaps, to say that the basic problem with the 
third interpretation is simply that it is incoherent to maintain that P1, P2, 
and P3 are all possibilities. Suppose that P1 is possible. Then, given the 
necessity of identity, (NI),  
(NI) For any x, y, if x = y, then for any possible world w, if x exists 
in w or y exists in w, then x = y in w 
if it is possible that A = RA, then in any world in which A or RA exist, A 
= RA, and since RA ≠ LA, it follows that it is not possible that A = LA. 
And if it is possible that A = LA, then it follows that it is not possible that 
A = RA. And if it is possible that A ≠ RA and A ≠ LA, then it follows that 
it is not possible that A = RA and it is not possible that A = LA. We 
cannot hold that each of P1, P2 and P3 are genuine possibilities. Only one 
of them can be. Thus, the third interpretation of the factual difference in 
fact involves a claim that is false, namely, that P1 and P2 are both 
genuine possibilities.  11
P1, P2 and P3 strike us as prima facie possibilities, but they cannot all be 
genuine conceptual or metaphysical possibilities. In what sense are they 
possibilities? The answer, I think, and this will now connect the 
discussion of this interpretation with the discussion in the previous 
section, is that P1, P2 and P3 are epistemic, not metaphysical or 
conceptual possibilities. They are epistemic possibilities because when 
we think of ourselves in the first person mode we do so directly, without 
thereby revealing what our natures are. 
We can imagine what it would be like to be one or the other of the two 
successors in a fission scenario by self-attributing future experiences 
appropriate for being the one or the other. We might, for example, be told 
that the right successor will prick the finger of her right hand while the 
left will prick the finger of her left hand. We can think of what it would  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 It might be suggested that NR needs only one of the two possibilities, not both. So she 11
might say: P1 is possible but not P2 or P2 is possible but not P1. But this is not the 
argument that NR is advancing, and, it seems, for good reason. For the problem with this 
that whatever might ground the claim that P1/P2 is possible would seem to ground the 
claim that the other is possible, given the symmetry of the setup. In addition, it amounts to 
the rejection of P3, which is the position of the materialist, and so without further 
argument it would be question begging. 
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be like to be in the position of the one, feeling the right finger pricked, 
rather than the left, or vice versa. In thinking of this, in the first person 
mode, imagining that one is feeling the prick tomorrow there, one thinks 
a thought that does not involve any incoherence. It is presented as an 
epistemic possibility at least relative to the content of the thought. This is 
not directly to think of ourselves as PR or PL. But it is a short step. For 
what seems compatible with D is that we are having experiences of a sort 
which only PR or which only PL would be having. Thus, it will seem 
open (relative to the content of the thought) that we are PR or PL, 
respectively. And when we think of others faced with fissioning, we can 
imaginatively project ourselves into their shoes and see that they can 
conceive the same thing from their point of view. It is epistemically open 
for them as well, relative to the content of their future directed thoughts, 
that they are the one or the other. 
However, (a) these cannot be more than epistemic possibilities because 
they cannot both be metaphysical or conceptual possibilities given (NI), 
and (b) we have an explanation of why they are epistemic possibilities for 
us that does not require that they be genuine metaphysical or conceptual 
possibilities. For in thinking or imagining ourselves as feeling such and 
such a prick there, we have a thought of the form φ(I), where I use ‘I’ to 
represent the unmediated thinking of the subject of the thought by its 
subject. The nature of the object of thought is not presented in the 
thought. Consequently it appears open to us that it be true when all the 
conditions specified by the fissioning scenario are in place. But what we 
are picking out may be a material object even if not so presented. 
Consequently what we are thinking, coherently so far as the content of 
the thought goes, may not be a genuinely possibility, because as a matter 
of fact we have empirical conditions for transtemporal identity.  
Our epistemic position with respect to our natures in first person thought 
is analogous to our position with respect to the natures of stuffs for which 
we introduce natural kind terms. We attach natural kind terms to natural 
kinds through application to examples we pick out by how they present 
themselves to us. But the kind properties that we aim to keep track of are 
not given by the features by which we pick them out. So the thoughts we 
entertain about them (prior to discovering what the kind property is) do 
not reveal their natures to us. So too in thinking of ourselves in the first 
person mode, how we pick out ourselves does not reveal what we are, 
and so it is epistemically open what sort of thing we are. The difference is 
that we are not picking ourselves out by any features we have, so that the 
self is not presented to us in the first person mode of thought in any 
positive way whatsoever. All of that lies in what we predicate of the self. 
To summarize, NR is right that requiring that we have our transtemporal 
identity conditions essentially together with the assumption that, for 
instance, P1 is possible, entails that we are not material things or 
constituted from material things. But even granting the premise, this  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doesn’t rescue the argument on the third interpretation of factual 
difference. For the third interpretation asserts that P1 and P2 (and in fact 
P3) are all genuine possibilities. But this is impossible given (NI). P1, P2 
and P3 are rather epistemic possibilities. That they are epistemic 
possibilities is explained by the fact that in first person mode future 
attributions of properties we pick out ourselves directly, and so in a way 
that does not present itself as in conflict with our being one or the other 
of the successors in a fission case because it is silent on what our natures 
are and so on whether we have empirical criteria of transtemporal 
identity.  !
5. Summary and Conclusion !
I have argued that the fourth interpretation that NR offers of “factual 
difference” in her (2010) argument for subject-body dualism does not 
secure an interpretation on which the argument goes through, but that a 
more fundamental claim motivates this way of putting the factual 
difference that carries the argument by itself, namely, that first person 
thought involves a positive conception of the self that excludes our 
having empirical criteria of cross-temporal identity. In response, I argued 
that in first person thought, we think of ourselves directly. We do not 
present ourselves under a special concept that rules out our having 
transtemporal identity conditions. Thus, the crucial premise in the 
underlying argument is mistaken. I argued further that the third 
interpretation, that P1 and P2 are both genuine possibilities, is 
incompatible with the necessity of identity. They are instead epistemic 
possibilities that are explained by our primary reference to ourselves 
being direct in a way that does not reveal what sort of thing we are.  !
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